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upon thirty days written notice for any reason whatsoever other
than the health of the subscriber.

This issue is, however,

irrelevant to this appeal.
3.

Plaintiffs' paragraph three is correct/ but

irrelevant.
4.

BCBSU does not dispute the assertions of

paragraph four, but they are disputed by other parties,
unestablished as yet, and irrelevant to this appeal.
5.

The assertions of paragraph five are essentially

true, but irrelevant.
6.

The facts asserted in paragraph six, in

particular the bald assertion that "Uninsureds will never be
able to obtain health insurance coverage for the chronic and
serious illnesses that they experience," are not established in
the record, and are disputed.

They are also completely

irrelevant to this appeal.
7.

Plaintiffs' attempt to explain in paragraph seven

their reasons for not originally naming BCBSU as a defendant is
gratuitous and improper.

No citation to the record supports

this assertion; it is not established by the testimony of any
witness, and may not be relied upon on appeal.
8.

Similarly, plaintiffs' assertion in paragraph

eight that "the named defendants began pointing their fingers
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at BCBSU" is unsupported in the record, and may not be
introduced on appeal.
9.

Paragraph nine contains even more egregious

efforts to supplement the record on appeal with unproven
facts.

Plaintiffs allege that "on September 13, 1988

Uninsureds informed counsel for BCBSU that because of the
information obtained in the Mr. West's deposition" they would
add BCBSU as a defendant.

BCBSU denies that it was informed at

this early date that it would be named as a defendant; nothing
in the record establishes this fact, no citation to the record
supports it, and it was not a part of the record reviewed by
the trial court in reaching its decision.
10.

In paragraph ten, plaintiffs assert that on

September 27, 1988 BCBSU requested that depositions previously
scheduled be continued so that BCBSU could be present.

BCBSU

disputes the assertion; it is unfounded in the record, no
citation to the record is given (the only citation is to the
notice establishing that the depositions were continued), the
trial court did not consider any such evidence, and the attempt
to distort the record in this manner is objectionable.
11.

Paragraphs eleven, twelve and thirteen are true.

12.

Paragraph fourteen represents another unwarranted

attempt to expand the record.

While it is true that plaintiffs
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served a request for production of documents on December 12,
there is no basis in the record for stating that "uninsureds
began preparing their case against BCBSU" on this date.
13.

Paragraphs fifteen through twenty-eight are true,

except that BCBSU "participated" in the deposition of Jack
Sheets only to the extent that its counsel defended the
deposition and asserted appropriate objections; no questions
were posed by BCBSU to Mr. Sheets.
14.

Paragraph twenty-nine includes yet another

improper attempt to supplement the record on appeal.
Plaintiffs' assertion that they "finalized document preparation
for their case against BCBSU" is unsupported in the record; the
fact that document requests were served is the only matter of
record.
15.

Similarly, in paragraph thirty, plaintiffs claim,

without any support in the record, that they "began preparing
their response" to interrogatories on March 10, 1989. No
evidence was introduced below about what steps, if any, were
taken to prepare interrogatory responses, and BCBSU again
objects to this impermissible and unfair assertion about facts
outside the record.
16.

Paragraph thirty-one is true but irrelevant;

actions taken by other defendants have no bearing on a
determination of how extensively BCBSU participated in the case.
-4-

17.

Paragraphs thirty-one and thirty-two are true.

18.

Paragraph thirty-four contains yet another

unfounded, impermissible supplementation of the record with the
assertion that the plaintiffs were not relieved of their
obligation to respond to interrogatories from BCBSU until
April 4.

BCBSU believes that communication occurred earlier/

but, in any event/ no evidence was introduced on this subject
below, the record does not support this assertion/ and it
cannot be relied upon on appeal.
19.

Paragraphs thirty-five and thirty-six are true.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court's decision- is not based upon
findings of fact which are reversible only if clearly
erroneous.

The district court concluded that BCBSU had waived

its right to compel arbitration on account of its conduct in
the litigation prior to invoking this remedy.

The facts about

the participation of BCBSU in the litigation and the actions
taken by the plaintiffs on account of the participation of
BCBSU below are a matter of record.

No evidentiary hearing was

held/ no determination was made about the credibility of any
witness and no evidentiary conflicts were resolved.

Therefore,

this court is free to draw its own legal conclusion from the
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undisputed facts and should reverse the erroneous conclusion
reached by the district court.
Plaintiffs failed to establish below that BCBSU caused
them material prejudice by extensive participation in
litigation before seeking to compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs

argue that a delay in asserting the right to arbitration will
cause a delay in their recovery.

This argument is of no avail

since there is no reason to assume that they will recover
anything in this lawsuit.
prejudice.

Proof of delay is not proof of

Furthermore/ the plaintiffs did not spend

significant time or money responding to motions filed by BCBSU,
or discovery initiated by BCBSU, nor did they prepare for trial
in reliance on the expectation that BCBSU would forgo
arbitration.

Since there is no evidence which would support a

finding of prejudice to the plaintiffs by the conduct of BCBSU,
the trial court's conclusion cannot be upheld under any
standard of review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CASE IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW UNDER THE
"CORRECTION OF ERROR" STANDARD
Plaintiffs inaccurately characterize the trial courts'
ruling as one based upon findings of fact which can only be

-6-

reversed if clearly erroneous.

In reality, the trial court

resolved no factual issues in reaching its decision; reviewing
undisputed facts about the participation of all parties in the
litigation, the court concluded that BCBSU waived its right to
compel arbitration.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit said in Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887
(2nd Cir. 1985):
Where, as here, the concern is whether the
undisputed facts of defendants' pre-trial
participation in the litigation satisfy the
standard for waiver, the question of waiver
of arbitration is one of law, (citations
omitted) and is fully reviewable on appeal
free from the clearly erroneous standard of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) applicable to factual
findings by the district court.
In accord: Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691,
693 (9th Cir. 1986).
No evidentiary hearing was held below and no testimony
was taken on the issue raised by this appeal.

The plaintiffs

attempt to characterize the court's decision as fact finding by
arguing that the court reviewed "many sources of information
including the Uninsured's verified complaint and attached
exhibits, affidavits of each of the eleven uninsureds and
attached exhibits, the written contract between BCBSU and the
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Uninsureds, summaries of deposition testimony . . . etc."
(Brief of Appellees, p. 12.)

However/ none of these materials

contain evidence which was relied upon by the court in ruling
on the issue of waiver.
The plaintiffs below resisted the motion to compel
arbitration on several grounds; among them that the right to
arbitrate was waived, but also because plaintiffs claim they
were not properly notified of the inclusion of an arbitration
provision in their contract, and that the provision was
otherwise unenforceable.

The affidavits of the plaintiffs went

only to the question whether they received notice of the
arbitration amendment, with some admitting receipt and some
denying it.

(R 608-648).

The trial court, however, never

reached this issue.
Similarly, the court's review of the contract and the
complaint would only have been for the purpose of determining
whether the complaint alleged causes of action which were
within the scope of the arbitration provision, another issue
not addressed by the court.

As to depositions, the record

discloses that none were published.

No deposition testimony

was relied upon, or cited, except in plaintiffs' persistent
attempts to inject arguments about the merits of the dispute
into the resolution of this procedural issue.
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The question of waiver, as explained in BCBSU's
opening brief, rests solely upon a determination of whether
BCBSU's participation in the lawsuit prior to demanding
arbitration was substantial, and significantly prejudicial to
the plaintiffs.

The participation of BCBSU and of other

parties in the litigation is a matter of record, reflected by
filing dates, the presence and absence of discovery notices,
etc.

No conflicting testimony or evidentiary disputes had to

be resolved to identify the facts about the parties' conduct in
the litigation.
In Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d
916, 918 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed
the decision of a trial court that a parent's consent to
adoption was not knowingly given.

The court described the

applicable standard of review as follows:
Normally we would review this determination
by the factfinder under the standard set
forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), giving great
deference to the trial judge's ability to
assess the credibility of witnesses and
setting aside the finding only if clearly
erroneous. However, because no evidentiary
hearing was held, Judge Moffat had before
him only the affidavits of the natural
mother, the counselor, and the obstetrician,
described above, the transcript of the June
24 appearance before Judge Murphy, and the
natural mother's written consent to adoption
executed that day. Because the trial
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court's finding was based solely on these
written materials and involved no assessment
of witness credibility or competency, this
court is in as good a position as the trial
court to examine the evidence de novo and
determine the facts.
It is true, as pointed out by plaintiffs, that the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (unlike the Second and
Ninth Circuits) held in Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986) that a finding of waiver of
the right to arbitrate is a legal conclusion, but that the
findings upon which the conclusions were based are predicate
questions of fact which may not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous.

However, even courts which might adhere to this

mixed standard of review note that where the trial court makes
no predicate findings of fact, the decision is treated on
appeal as a purely legal one which "follows from the undisputed
facts of defendants' pre-trial participation in litigation",
Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d
291, 294, note 2 (1st Cir. 1986).
In its memorandum decision and separate order the
trial court did no more than state that "[t]he court finds that
Blue Cross & Blue Shield has participated in the litigation
since being joined as a party defendant to such an extent that
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any right to arbitration has been waived and that the
arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining
parties" (R 709, 720) (Appendix to Opening Brief of BCBSU).
These are not "predicate factual findings" which are entitled
to deference on appeal.

The trial court looked at a record

which contained no testimony or evidentiary conflicts and
reached a legal conclusion which was wrong.

This court should

correct its error.
POINT II
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT
BCBSU SUBSTANTIALLY PARTICIPATED IN
LITIGATION TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFFS
Apparently, the parties do not disagree about the
legal test which applies to a claim of waiver of the right to
arbitrate:

a party waives an otherwise enforceable right to

arbitrate a dispute only by substantial participation in
litigation which materially prejudices the party opposing
arbitration.

Furthermore, plaintiffs do not deny that there is

a presumption in favor of arbitration and that one who claims
waiver bears a heavy burden of proof; Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); (see
also other authorities cited under Point I of the opening brief
of BCBSU).
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Whether this court applies a "correction of error" or
a "clearly erroneous" standard, the record does not support the
trial court's finding of waiver.

Except for those few cases

which hold that mere failure to assert the defense of
arbitration in an answer constitutes waiver (a legal position
the plaintiffs themselves do not advocate), neither party has
identified any case in which participation in litigation as
minimal as that of BCBSU was held to constitute a waiver.
Plaintiffs persist in comparing the facts of the case
at bar to those of Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v. Carpenters
District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).

In the Reid

Burton case, a labor union sought to compel arbitration after
the trial of the case had begun, having previously disavowed
the applicability of the arbitration contract, and after
participating in a pre-trial conference without raising the
arbitration defense.

In contrast, the trial court below

specifically found that the case was not ready for a trial
setting (R 458), no hearing had been held on any matter before
arbitration was sought, and no motion had been filed by BCBSU
seeking relief of any kind.
More importantly, the trial court never made a clear
factual finding of prejudice and nothing in the record supports
a finding that plaintiffs were prejudiced by BCBSU's delay in
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moving to compel arbitration.

The trial court, as noted,

stated that "arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on
the remaining parties."

(R 720). This observation reveals the

flaws in the trial court's legal analysis.

It is wholly-

irrelevant whether other defendants are burdened by
arbitration; they are not subject to the arbitration agreement
and would have no standing to claim it was waived.1/
Moreover, the question is not whether arbitration itself would
prejudice the opposing party, but whether the delay in its
assertion caused prejudice.
Neither the trial court nor the plaintiffs have
succeeded in explaining how the plaintiffs have been prejudiced
by the timing of BCBSU1s arbitration motion.

The plaintiffs

continue to argue that a delay in moving to compel arbitration
has delayed them in obtaining the relief they seek.

This

argument assumes that plaintiffs1 position on the merits is

•1/ Plaintiffs argue under Point IV of their brief that the
other parties will be prejudiced by having plaintiffs* claims
against BCBSU subject to arbitration and that it will be
inconvenient to everyone to proceed in separate forums. This
"prejudice", as noted in the opening brief of BCBSU, is
inherent in the finding that two of the parties agreed to
arbitrate their dispute; it has nothing to do with the question
whether delay has caused prejudice and is irrelevant to this
appeal. Furthermore, none of the other parties did oppose the
motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration.
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correct and that they will obtain the relief they seek.

No

court addressing the question of prejudice starts with this
assumption; it amounts to nothing more than the contention that
delay itself proves prejudice, a position which is simply not
the law, Rush v. Qppenheimer & Co., supra, 779 F.2d at 887,
("It is beyond question that defendants' delay in seeking
arbitration during approximately eight months of pretrial
proceedings is insufficient by itself to constitute a waiver of
the right to arbitrate, for in addition, prejudice to Rush must
be demonstrated"). Furthermore, since arbitration is a
streamlined process, it is impossible to know whether a delay
in moving to compel arbitration will actually result in a delay
of the disposition of the case, even if that question were
dispositive.
Instead, courts have almost invariably focused their
analysis on whether the party seeking arbitration has filed
motions or engaged in discovery which caused the opposing party
to spend significant time and money it would not otherwise have
expended; Rush v. Qppenheimer & Co., supra. Board of Educ. Taos
Mun. v. The Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985);
Lee v. Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Colo. 1988); Benqiovi v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 92012 at
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91,018 (D.D.C. April 25, 1985) (". . . plaintiff has been
required to produce documents, answer deposition questions, and
file an opposition to the summary judgment motion . . .

In

light of this delay in seeking arbitration and the resulting
prejudice to plaintiff, Pru-Bache cannot now to [sic] rely on
the Customer Agreement to compel arbitration.")
BCBSU filed neither a motion for summary judgment nor
any other motion but a motion to compel arbitration.
Plaintiffs, unable to point to this frequently cited source of
prejudice, are left having to contend that they were prejudiced
by the participation of BCBSU in discovery.

This position is

untenable.
BCBSU didn't schedule a single deposition.

The

depositions of the plaintiffs were taken by codefendants before
BCBSU was ever named as a party.

The only depositions taken

after BCBSU was joined were depositions scheduled and taken by
the plaintiffs.

How could the plaintiffs have been prejudiced

by the attendance of BCBSU at depositions they scheduled and
took?

Plaintiffs imply that they were prejudiced when BCBSU

identified and produced a corporate spokesman for a deposition
in response to their request.

Plaintiffs have not shown,

however, or even argued that they would not have sought this
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discovery in arbitration^/ or that the results were wasteful
rather than beneficial.
Plaintiffs make the absurd argument that they were
prejudiced by receiving interrogatory answers and documents
from BCBSU.

Most of the documents were already produced in

response to a subpoena served upon BCBSU prior to being joined
as a defendant.

(R 180). Moreover, plaintiffs did not contend

that they received documents or information which would not be
sought or used in arbitration.
Admittedly, BCBSU served discovery requests upon the
plaintiffs which they were never required to answer.
Plaintiffs improperly attempt to supplement the record on
appeal with the assertions that they began preparing their
responses the day they received them and nearly completed them
before being relieved of the duty to answer.

The record is

devoid of any evidence that the plaintiffs expended time or
resources responding to discovery from BCBSU and it is clear
that BCBSU obtained no benefit from any such discovery.

As the

District Court for the District of Colorado observed, "courts
generally have held that rights under an arbitration agreement
are only waived where the parties have engaged in extensive

2/ Discovery is permitted under the Utah Arbitration Act.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-6(3)(6).
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pre-trial discovery, and where the party opposing arbitration
will suffer material prejudice . . . M , Lee v. Grandcor Medical
Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp., at 255 (emphasis supplied).
Without question, BCBSU was not a participant in extensive
pre-trial discovery which materially prejudiced the plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs feebly attempt to bring themselves
within the holding of cases that where one party has completed
trial preparation before arbitrability is asserted, the other
party has suffered prejudice.

Plaintiffs improperly assert in

their statement of facts that they began preparing their case
against BCBSU in December, 1988 and completed "document
preparation" for their case against BCBSU on March 10, 1989
when they served BCBSU with interrogatories and requests.
Again, the plaintiffs flout this court's rules by attempting to
add evidence to the record which was not introduced below.

Not

only are these assertions irrelevant, but they lack
credibility.

Neither a trial nor a pre-trial was scheduled

when BCBSU moved to compel arbitration.

No party claimed below

to have been near completion of discovery or involved in trial
preparation.
In this case, unlike many others where the issue is
raised, BCBSU was only one of several defendants, and the other
parties engaged in litigation for a year before it was joined.

-17-

In the four and one-half month interval between the answer and
motion of BCBSU/ discovery proceeded exactly as it would have
had BCBSU not been joined.

Plaintiffs have not established any

way in which their time and resources were wasted by the brief
presence of BCBSU in the lawsuit.

A finding of prejudice

simply cannot be supported.

CONCLUSION
The facts which underlie this appeal were not disputed
below.

From the moment it was named as a defendant, BCBSU was

engaged responding to a barrage of discovery from the
plaintiffs and other parties.
was wholly responsive.

Its conduct in the litigation

It filed no motions and obtained no

discovery from other parties.

As a result, the plaintiffs did

not expend time and money litigating with BCBSU in ways that
would be wasted if the matter is arbitrated.

These facts are

easily discernible from the record.
The parties agree that BCBSU should be deemed to have
waived its right to arbitrate only if it substantially
participated in litigation to the material prejudice of the
plaintiffs before seeking arbitration.

Because the

participation of BCBSU was neither substantial nor prejudicial,
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it did not waive its right to arbitrate.

The contrary-

conclusion of the district court should be reversed.
DATED this

/'

day of October, 1990.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By.
David R. Money /(USB #38§7)
Timothy C. Houp't (USB #1543)
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah
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